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NOTES
IRREBUTTABLE

PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE: APPLIED TO
STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS EXCLUDING FEMALES FROM
CONTACT SPORTS-Yellow Springs Exempted Village School
District Board of Education v. Ohio High School Athletic
Association, 443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the early part of this decade, state high school athletic
association rules barring females from participation in various interscholastic sports have been invalidated at both the state' and
federal2 level. The recent federal district court decision in Yellow Springs Exempted Village School District Board of Education v. Ohio
High School Athletic Association3 conforms to this trend by requiring
equal opportunity for females in state high school athletics. Judicial
invalidation of these discriminatory regulations has generally been based on one of the various state laws prohibiting sex discrimination" or
on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth :amendment to the
United States Constitution.' In contrast, the court in Yellow Springs
found that an Ohio High School Athletic Association rule, by creating
an irrebuttable presumption of female nonqualification, violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Moreover, the court
extended its decision beyond the challenged state regulation to find
that 45 C.F.R. section 86.41(b),7 a federal administrative guideline for
providing equal athletic opportunity in public schools, violates the due
process clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitutions to the extent that it authorizes the exclusion of females from
1. E.g., Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975); Commonwealth
v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Assoc., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 45, 334 A.2d 839

(1975).
2. E.g., Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973)
Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977); Reed v. Nebraska School
Activities Assoc., 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972).
3. 443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
4. See cases cited note 1 supra.
5. See cases cited note 2 supra.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 provides that: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
7. See note 17 infra. An unusual aspect of the court's consideration of 45 C.F.R.
§ 86.41(b) is that the constitutionality of this regulation was not raised by the parties.

For this reason it is questionable whether the appellate court will review this part of the
decision.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any person...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property; without due process of law."
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contact sports. Yellow Springs is the first recorded decision to consider
the constitutionality of this federal regulation.
This casenote will examine both findings of the court, each of
which break new judicial ground in the area of sports. The distinctions
in methodology and effect between an equal protection analysis and a
due process analysis will be discussed in order to compare the two different approaches to invalidation of sexually discriminatory athletic
rules. Then the specific language of 45 C.F.R. section 86.41(b) and
related sections9 will be examined in reviewing the Yellow Springs
court's decision that this federal regulation is unconstitutional.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1974 two female students qualified for positions on an
interscholastic basketball team in a school within the jurisdiction of the
Yellow Springs School Board. However, their membership on the team
violated an Ohio High School Athletic Association rule prohibiting
females from participating in contact sports.'" Noncompliance with
this regulation would have excluded the basketball team from
interscholastic competition and might have resulted in the suspension
of the school from the state athletic association. To avoid such consequences, the board of education excluded the girls from the team and
created a separate girls team on which they could participate. Subsequently, the board brought a class action suit against the athletic
association and various "State defendants,"" alleging that the regulation violated both the equal protection clause and due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
III.

DECISION OF THE COURT

The fourteenth amendment states that "No state shall ...

deprive

process of law." 12
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
One of the liberty interests protected by the due process clause is
freedom of choice in matters of "education and the acquisition of
knowledge."' 3 Relying on this principle, the court in Yellow Springs
determined that the athletic regulation which arbitrarily excluded girls
9. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.41(a), (c) (1976).
10. Ohio High School Athletic Association (O.H.S.A.A.) Rule 1 § 6: "In all contact sports (Football, Wrestling, Ice Hockey and Basketball) team members shall be
boys only."
11. Other defendants included the Ohio Board of Education, the Ohio Department of Education, and two of its officers: the Superintendent of Public Instruction,
and the Director of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
13. 443 F. Supp. at 760 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)).
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from interscholastic teams in contact sports denied them the freedom of
choice in a protected interest.I
The court recognized, however, that deprivation of liberty is allowed if based upon a sufficiently important governmental interest. Two
possible governmental interests underlying the arbitrary exclusion of
girls from contact sports were considered by the court: maximization
of female athletic opportunities and prevention of injuries." Although
recognizing the legitimacy of these goals, the court determined that the
approach of the rule to both these possible interests was predicated
upon an irrebuttable presumption that girls are athletically inferior to
boys. Because this conclusive presumption is not universally true, and
could be rebutted if girls were given an opportunity to compete with
boys, the court found that the presumption denied girls a protected
liberty interest without due process of law. Due process requires that a
girl be given the procedural opportunity to show whether or not she is
qualified. The court invalidated the athletic regulation based on this
unconstitutional presumption and determined that girls who are
qualified must be allowed to compete with boys in interscholastic
sports. 16
The Yellow Springs School Board argued that the athletic association rule not only violated the fourteenth amendment, but that it also
conflicted with 45 C.F.R. section 86.41(b). 17 The school board interpreted this federal regulation as permissive, allowing each school to
decide whether to permit girls to compete with boys in contact sports.' 8
14. 443 F. Supp. at 760.
15. Id. at 758. Neither of these state goals were argued by the defendants. The thrust
of their defense was the O.H.S.A.A. Rule 1 § 6, although it prohibits mixed teams in
contact sports, does not preclude separate teams. Accordingly, defendants argued that
O.H.S.A.A. Rule 1 § 6 does not conflict with 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b); as contended by
the plaintiffs. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgement at 6-7, Yellow Springs exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. O.H.S.A.A., 443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio
1978) [hereinafter referred to as Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment]. See
notes 17-20 infra and accompanying text for plaintiff's contentions.
16. 443 F. Supp. at 760.
17. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) provides that, despite the general admonition against sex
discrimination in athletics announced in 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a),
[A] recipient may operate or sponsor teams for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based on competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient oprates or sponsors a team in a particular
sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members
of the other sex and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously
been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out for the team
offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and
other sports the purpose of the major activity of which involves bodily contact.
18. Complaint at 6-12; Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 8-11(a),
Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Rd. of Educ. v. O.H.S.A.A., 443 F.
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Because the state regulation absolutely prohibited girls from participating in contact sports, the school board contended that this rule
conflicted with the federal regulation, and that under the supremacy
9
clause of the United States Constitution the permissive federal
0
regulation superseded the compulsory state regulation. The court
stated that it was unnecessary to decide the validity of this supremacy
clause argument because the federal regulation, to the extent that it
authorized schools to deny qualified girls from competing in contact
1
sports with males, violated the due process clause."
IV.

EQUAL PROTECTION OR IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION?

The underlying policy in invalidating athletic classifications based
on sex is that eligibility to play a sport must be based upon individualized determinations. Courts have generally invalidated sexually
discriminatory athletic rules through the equal protection analysis."
A review of the factors involved in both equal protection and due process analyses illustrates why the latter is a more effective method for
invalidating sex-based classifications such as the athletic regulation
considered in Yellow Springs.
A.

The Equal Protection Analysis

The equal protection clause does not require that there be absolute
equality under the laws. 3 It does require that a law treat alike all
persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
statute. 2" The government often must classify citizens into groups and,
on the basis of the classification, treat one group differently from
another." In deciding whether this different treatment violates the
equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has developed different
standards of review. Where a statute discriminates against a category
drawn by race' 6 or national origin, 2" the classification is considered
Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978) [hereinafter cited as Complaint and Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment].
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the Supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
20. Complaint at 13-14; Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 12-16.
21. 443 F. Supp. at 761.
22. See note 2 supra.
23. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
24. Yick Wo v.'Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886).
25. Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954).
26. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
27. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/8
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and will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.2" Strict

scrutiny will also be applied where the classification affects a fundamental constitutional right. 29 Under the strict scrutiny standard the
burden is on the state to show that the classification is necessary for
the accomplishment of compelling state interest. Where fundamental
rights or suspect classifications are not in issue, the minimum rationality test is applied. Thus, the legislative classification will be upheld

unless it is shown to be patently arbitrary and to bear no rational
relationship to a legitimate government interest.30
Because the Supreme Court has not found sex to be a suspect
classification,' and because education is not considered a fundamental
right,3" the strict scrutiny test has been applied in only a few decisions

concerning sexual discrimination in school athletics.3 3 Relying on the

less strict minimum rationality test, many courts have upheld sexually
discriminatory athletic rules. 3'
Judicial approval of sex-based classifications based on the

minimum rationality test has been the subject of much criticism."
Some state courts 36 and federal courts 37 have recognized that
discrimination based on sex operates in the same manner as discrimination based on the suspect classifications of race and national origin.
Like the latter classifications, sex is an immutable, visible characteristic
28. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2749 (1978).
29. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
30. See e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (ceiling on welfare funds
that could be received by any one family did not impermissibly discriminate against
large families); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday Blue Laws did
not discriminate in favor of certain types of businesses).
31. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (only four Justices concurred in
declaring that sex is a suspect classification).
32. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
33. Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973); Gilpin
v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1974).
34. Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F. Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa.
1973), aff'd 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975) (classification rational on basis that competition with boys would expose girls to injury); Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F.
Supp. 930 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (purpose of encouraging girls to compete in their own class
sufficient for sex-based classification); Bucha v. Illinois High School Assoc., 351 F.
Supp. 69 (D.C. Il. 1972) (physical and psychological differences between the sexes
justified exclusion of girls from boys' swimming team).
35. See, e.g., Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in
American Law, 48 NEB. L. REV. 131 (1968).
36. Sail'er Inn Inc. v. Kerby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971);
see Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968); Pittsburg Press Co. v.
Pitssburg Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972).
aff'd on other grounds, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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which results in widespread stereotyping and disregard for individual
ability.
follow
Reacting to this criticism, the Supreme Court has chosen to
rationality in sexa middle route between strict scrutiny and minimum
3 8 the Court invalidated a
ual discrimination cases. In Reed v. Reed,
and substantial
sex-based classification because it did not have a "fair
in similar
persons
all
relation to the object of the legislation,3 9 so that
Court
the
Five years later
circumstances shall be treated alike."
v. Boren, 0 in
adopted a somewhat stricter standard of review in Craig
articulated.
which a specific standard for sex-based classifications was
objecgovernment
"Classifications by gender must serve important
of those
tives and must be substantially related to the achievement
objectives.""'
proIf the court in Yellow Springs had decided the issue on equal
Craig
by
set
tection grounds, it probably would have used the standard
which exv. Boren, the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement
court,
plicitly refers to sex-based classifications. The Yellow Springs
or to
standard
however, did not choose to apply an equal protection
to
relationship
engage in a complicated analysis of state goals and their
regulathe sex-based classifications. Instead it invalidated the athletic
this
using
By
presumption.
tion as an unconstitutional irrebuttable
deciCourt
Supreme
basis for invalidation, the court followed such"3
"
Board
sions as Stanley v. Illinois, ' vlandis v. Kline, and Cleveland
of Education v. La Fleur."
The IrrebuttablePresumptionAnalysis
Although the equal protection clause and the irrebuttable presumption doctrine are both utilized in striking down unconstitutional
these two
statutory classifications, significant differences exist between
that is
one
is
presumption
methods of judicial review. An irrebuttable
class
the
of
neither necessarily nor universally true of all members

B.

367 F.
37. See, e.g., Wisenfeld v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,
F.
281
York,
v.
States
United
(1975);
636
U.S.
420
Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973) aff'd,
Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
38. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
39. Id. at 76.
40. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
41. Id. at 197.
fathers
42. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (Illinois statute irrebuttably presumed that unwed
are unfit parents).
non43. 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (Connecticut statute irrebuttably presumed that
resident students at time of application to state university remained non-residents).
irrebuttably
44. 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave regulation
teach).
to
unfit
physically
are
teachers
pregnant
that
presumed

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/8

19791

NOTES

which it encompasses, but which nevertheless precludes an individual
from presenting contrary proof."5 If the irrebuttable presumption is
invalid as to but one person, than that person has been denied his right
to a fair hearing guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 6 Applying this reasoning, the Supreme Court invalidated
a mandatory maternity leave regulation in La Fleur on the basis that
the rule was predicated on an irrebuttable presumption that all
teachers beyond the fourth month of pregnancy are physically incapable of teaching. 7
Viewed in this light, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is
relatively simple compared to the complexities involved with the
various equal protection tests, and thus it is a more efficient means of
invalidation. Irrebuttable presumption as a method of statutory
analysis, however, has been subjected to two strong criticisms. These
arguments, even if plausible as general propositions, are inapplicable
to situations in which the irrebuttable presumption analysis is used to
invalidate gender-based athletic regulations.
The foremost criticism is that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is actually an attack on lawmaking itself.4 8 That is, because practically all laws contain classifications which are not universally true,
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine could be used indiscriminately to
strike down legislation." A statute capable of passing the most
stringent equal protection test could nevertheless be invalidated using
an irrebuttable presumption analysis.5 Justice Rehnquist, strongly
dissenting in La Fleur, envisioned invalidation of such laws as those
prescribing age limits for voting, marriage, drivers' licences and the
purchase of alcholic beverages.5 '
This indiscriminate invalidation argument is weakened by other
factors involved in an irrebuttable presumption analysis. Such an
45. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1358 (Chadbourne rev. 1972); see Keeton, Statutory
Presumptions- Their Constitutionalityand Legal Effect, 10 TEX. L. REV. 34 (1931).
46. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (revocation of drivers' licenses);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (summary termination of welfare
benefits); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (pretrial garnishment
of wages).
47. See note 45 supra.
48. See, e.g., 412 U.S. at 462 (dissent, C.J. Burger); Comment, Some Thoughts
on the Emerging IrrebuttablePresumption Doctrine, 7 IND. L. REV. 644 (1974); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: The Irrebuttable Presumption-An Alternative to Equal
Protection, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 141 (1975); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974).
49. See cases and authorities cited note 48 supra.
50. Note, An Inquiry Into the Use of the IrrebuttablePresumption Doctrine as a
Due Process Standard, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 365, 385-86 (1975).
51. 414 U.S. at 658-59.
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analysis requires individual determination only when it is a reasonable
52
alternative to the arbitrary classification. Because the Supreme Court
3
has recognized administrative efficiency as a valid state goal, a
presumption would probably be upheld if individual determinations
would create burdensome administrative problems. And if such an interest is joined with another valid state interest, such as protection of
public health and welfare, then it is even more probable that the
54
presumption, would be upheld.
Considering these factors, it is highly unlikely that statutes such as
those prescribing age requirements would be invalidated through the
use of the irrebuttable presumption analysis. Overwhelming administrative problems and the government's interest in insuring that
only mature, responsible people exercise certain rights and privileges
would outweigh the need for individualized determinations. Furthermore, any standard established to test each person's qualifications
55
would likely be as arbitrary as the age requirement.
On the other hand, an athletic association rule excluding female
students from participation in interscholastic contact sports is appropriately subject to an irrebuttable presumption analysis. Permitting
qualified females to participate would create no greater administrative
problems than those which already exist. Individual, objective determinations are made for males; such determinations could just as easily
be made for females. Although the state has an interest in protecting the
health and welfare of female athletes, it also has a similar interest in pro6
tecting male athletes. Even weak and handicapped boys are at least
given a chance to qualify. Thus, determination on an individual basis
for both sexes is a reasonable alternative to a regulation which
arbitrarily excludes all females.
52. 412 U.S. at 452.
53. Id. at 451; 405 U.S. at 656.
54. Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From
Rodriguez to La Fleur, 62 GEO. L.J. 1173, 1200 (1974).
55. For example, the eighteen year old voting requirement is arguably based upon
two presumptions: 1) persons below this age are financially dependent and don't actually have a "stake" in the election outcome, and 2) those under this age are not sufficiently politically informed to make a rational decision at the polls. The first
presumption might be easily rebutted by proof of employment or financial responsibilities. But attempting to test a nebulous concept such as politicial awareness would
be extremely difficult and the test itself would necessarily be subjective and arbitrary.
56. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was designed to eliminate
discrimination on the basis of handicap in any federally funded program or activity. 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976). If a recipient offers athletics or similar programs, it must provide
qualified'handicapped students an equal opportunity to participate in those programs.
45 C.F.R. § 84.37(c)(1) (1977). HEW's official interpretation of this regulation provides: "Students who have lost an organ, limb, or appendage but who are otherwise
qualified, may not be excluded from contact sports .... " 43 Fed. Reg. 36035 (1978).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/8
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A second criticism of the irrebuttable presumption analysis is that
invalidation of a statute on that basis may simply result in a reenactment of the presumption in a modified form." The statute could be
modified by merely placing the burden of proof on the individual to
show that the presumption is invalid as applied to him or her." If the
statute were invalidated on an equal protection basis, however, the
court would have to hold that there existed no rational relationship
between the statute and a legitimate state interest, thus resulting in
total invalidation of the statute. 9
The possibility of reenacting the presumption may be of some
significance in situations where proof of qualification is not generally
required. In La Fleur the mandatory leave regulation could merely be
modified to include a provision requiring the teacher to demonstrate
her physical capability, although nonpregnant teachers are presumed
to be physically qualified. Similarly, in Stanley v. Illinois," where the
Supreme Court invalidated a statute which conclusively presumed that
6
unmarried fathers are unfit parents for child custody purposes, " the
state could still require proof of parental competency from unmarried
fathers, but not from married fathers. It is possible that the revised
statutes in both of these situations could be attacked on equal protecton grounds. 6
In athletics there is, in effect, a presumption that no one is
qualified because all prospective participants must prove their abilities
before team membership is granted. Therefore, invalidating a sexually
discriminatory regulation on an irrebuttable presumption basis merely
places females on the same footing as males; members of both sexes
must qualify before they can participate. An irrebuttable presumption
of nonqualification is merely altered to a rebuttable one which applies
to males as well as females. Invalidation on equal protection grounds
would be no more complete because females would still be required to
prove their capabilities in order to become team members.

57. See Note, supra note 54, at 1199.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
61. Id.
62. These statutes would be similar to the one invalidated on due process grounds
by the Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The statute
there provided that spouses of male members of the armed services are presumed to be
dependent for the purposes of obtaining increased benefits, while female members of
the same service must prove that their husbands are actually dependent for over one
half of their support in order to receive the same benefits.
Published by eCommons,

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 4:1

45 C.F.R. SECTION 86.41(b) AND TITLE IX
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of female participation in
athletics is in the area of contact sports. Stereotypical views of women
are not really challenged by the notion of a woman competing against
a man in a mannerly round of golf, but the vision of a woman "suiting
up" for football shatters traditional concepts of femininity. Therefore,
it is not surprising that some courts have permitted the exclusion of
females from contact sports. 3 Nevertheless, a fairly substantial
number of courts have granted injunctions enabling the challenging
female to participate in a particular contact sport," and other courts
have totally invalidated athletic regulations excluding females from
participation." The court in Yellow Springs not only invalidated the
athletic regulation, but also found that 45 C.F.R. section 86.41(b) is
unconstitutional to the extent that it authorizes a recipient of federal
aid to exclude females from contact sports.
Subsection (b) of 45 C.F.R. section 86.41 is one of the numerous
regulations implementing Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. 66 Generally, Title IX was designed to eliminate sexual discrimination in any educational program or activity. Senator Birch Bayh, the
sponsor of Title IX stated that it is "an important first step in the effort to provide the women of America something that is rightfully
theirs-an equal chance to attend the schools of their choice, to
develop the skills they want."'6
Paradoxically, section 86.41(b), a regulation implementing Title
IX, violates this legislative intent and is itself subject to a due process
challenge because it permits a sex-based classification. This regulation
authorizes separate teams for each sex "where selection for such teams
is based upon competitive skill or where the activity involved is a contact sport."' 8 Section 86.41(b) further provides that if only one team is
provided in a particular sport, and the sport had previously been
limited to one sex, members of the excluded sex "must be allowed to
try out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact
V.

sport.""
63. E.g., Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F. Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa.
1973), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975).
64. E.g., Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary School Atheletic Assoc., 415 F. Supp. 569
(E.D. Tenn. 1976); Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
65. E.g., Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977); Gilpin v. Kansas
State High School Activities Assoc., 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1974); Darrin v.
Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975); Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Assoc., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975).
66. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1978).
67. 118 CONG. REC. S5808 (1972).
68. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1976).
69. Id. For the complete text of this provision see note 17 supra.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/8
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Traditionally, females have been excluded from contact sports.
Regardless of the legislative intent of Title IX, the plain meaning of
section 86.41(b) is that educational institutions may continue to
arbitrarily exclude females from participating in contact sports with

males. 7 °
Given this construction, the Yellow Springs court correctly found
that 45 C.F.R. section 86.41(b) violated the due process clause. But
considering the hostility toward the irrebuttable presumption
analysis, 7 ' the question whether this regulation could withstand an
equal protection challenge should also be considered.
According to the Craig v. Boren"' test it must be shown that this
regulation serves an important government goal and that there is a
substantial relationship between this objective and the regulation. One
of the most compelling governmental interests which could be asserted is
the prevention of injuries. The Yellow Springs court found that the
regulation was based upon a presumption of general female inferiority in
athletics. Other false premises also underlie the government's approach
to this interest. These are: 1) that all women are more susceptible to injuries than men at the same levels of ability; 3 and 2) that all contact
sports are physically more dangerous than non-contact sports. 7" Both
premises are rebuttable. Women generally have a lighter weight and
bone structure than men, but there are widespread individual exceptions. Neither is it necessarily true that such physiological differences
70. Other provisions of section 86.41 are more in the spirit of Title IX. Section
86.41(a) states the general policy prohibiting sexual discrimination in athletics and
specifically provides that "no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on
such basis." 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (1976). Section 86.41(c) requires that a recipient provide equal athletic opportunity to members of both sexes and lists numerous factors
that will be considered in determining if this requirement has been met. 45 C.F.R. §
86.41(c) (1976). This lst includes such items as equipment, supplies, locker rooms,
training facilities, and medical services.
Probably the most important of these factors under section 86.41(c) is "whether
the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests
and abilities of the members of both sexes." The importance of the requirement of accomodating interests and abilities is indicated by HEW's position that separate teams
may be required even in contact sports if both boys and girls are sufficiently interested.
Office for Civil Rights, Dep't of HEW, Memorandum on Elimination of Sex
Discrimination in Athletic Programs at 6 (Sept. 1975).
Nevertheless, the contact sports exception, even when construed in conjunction
with the interests and abilities requirement does authorize a school to totally exclude
girls from contact sports. If only a few girls are interested in a sport, a school would
not be required to form a separate team for them, and neither must the school permit
them to participate on the boys' team.
71. See notes 48-52, 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
72. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
73. Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 34, 48, 60
(1974).
74. Id. at 60.
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result in more injuries because a woman may possess other qualities,
such as superior speed or coordination, which compensate for these
differences. Furthermore, non-contact sports can be as dangerous as
contact sports. For example, a non-contact sport such as down-hill ski
racing can result in crippling injuries."
Considering the overinclusiveness of these underlying assumptions,
the correlation between gender and ability to participate in contact
sports may be too weak to withstand an equal protection attack. The
problem with 45 C.F.R. section 86.41(b) is that it authorizes a
complete deprivation of an opportunity. Although this regulation encourages the development of separate teams, the only contact sports
teams available in most schools are the boys' teams. In situations
where no girls' team existed, courts have had little difficulty in finding
that the exclusion of girls from the boys' team is a denial of equal
protection. 6 The basis of these decisions is not that girls have a constitutional right to participate in a particular sport, but that the state,
having provided an athletic opportunity for males, may not deny this
opportunity to females." Because 45 C.F.R. section 86.41(b)
authorizes total exclusion of females from contact sports, this regulation violates the equal protection clause.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Opportunties for women have traditionally been restricted by
irrebuttable presumptions in many spheres of life. In the last decade
several such presumptions have finally been extinguished, and it is now
generally accepted that women must be free to pursue the interests
lifestyles and careers of their choosing. Thus, on a practical level, the
Yellow Springs court's invalidation of a gender-based athletic regulation on a due process basis is merely further recognition that overbroad generalizations concerning females should no longer be
tolerated. Whether a due process or an equal protection analysis is used,
a regulation arbitrarily denying girls the opportunity to participate in
interscholastic contact sports cannot withstand a constitutional attack.
As it is presently written, 45 C.F.R. section 86.41 is confusing and
inconsistent. Although this regulation was designed to provide equal
opportunity in athletics, subsection (b) specifically provides that
females may be excluded from contact sports whether or not a separate
75. Id.
76. E.g., Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Assoc., 444 F. Supp. 1117,
1122 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 170-71 (D. Colo.
1977); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Assoc., 337 F. Supp. 1233, 1242
(D. Kan. 1974).
77. See note 76 supra.
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female team exists, and whether or not the exclusion accomodates the
interests and abilities of females. Consideration of the constitutionality
of this regulation was unnecessary to the decision, but the Yellow
Springs court recognized that this regulation authorized discriminatory
athletic rules such as O.H.S.A.A. rule 1 section 6.78
The Yellow Springs court, by restricting its finding to the contact
sports exception of subsection (b) of 45 C.F.R. section 86.41, left
intact the remaining provisions of this subsection. Elimination of the
contact sports provision allows girls to participate on separate teams
and requires that they be permitted to try out for any noncontact or
contact sport previously limited to boys." Invalidation of this one
provision should maximize female athletic opportunities, 0 create con78. The defendants in Yellow Springs contended that O.H.S.A.A. Rule 1 § 6
complied with 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b). See note 15 supra. Recently, in Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Assoc., 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978), defendants
unsuccessfully urged that an exclusionary athletic rule could not be constitutionally attacked because it was in full compliance with 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b). The court ruled
that the federal regulation did not displace the fourteenth amendment as the basis for
constitutionality. Id. at 1122.
79. Where only a girls' team exists, boys could be excluded because their provisions athletic opportunities have not been limited. See note 17 for the complete text of
45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b).
80. One argument directed against requiring male teams to be open to females is
that if qualified females must be permitted to participate on male teams, then the
reverse must also be allowed, possibly resulting in male dominance of all athletic programs. Therefore, in order to maximize female athletic opportunities, females should
be excluded from male teams. For a fuller discussion see, Comment, Sex Discrimination in InterscholasticHigh School Athletics, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 535, 544 (1974).
Although recognizing the legitimacy of advancing female athletic opportunities as a
state interest, a number of courts have noted that this is an irrational basis for barring
women from men's teams. One court dismissed this justification on the basis that there
are presently few women's programs in existence that need to be protected from a male
take-over. Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 523, 289
N.E.2d 495, 500 (1972). The rationale is also overbroad. If only a boys' team exists,
excluding girls does not maximize athletic opportunities for girls, but acts to totally bar
qualified girls from participating. Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities
Assoc., Inc., 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1243 (D. Kan.1974). To actually maximize female
athletic opportunities, qualified girls must be allowed to participate on boys teams if
no girls' team of equal quality exists, and boys may be excluded from those teams
traditionally limited to girls. See, Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 170
(D.Colo. 1977).
Because Yellow Springs was decided on an irrebuttable presumption basis, it may
be more subject to the claim that boys must be able to participate on girls' teams.
That is, if a presumption of female nonqualification is unconstitutional, then a
presumption of male "overqualification" must also be unconstitutional and,
therefore, boys must be allowed on girls' teams. This conclusion is not necessarily true.
As in an equal protection analysis, state interest is a factor in an irrebuttable presumption analysis. See notes 53-54 and accompanying text supra. Underlying an irrebuttable
presumption of "overqualification" is the state's interest in maximizing female athletic
opportunities. Thus, if allowing boys on girls' teams would greatly decrease girls' par-
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sistency between the requirements of subsection (b) and the accomoda8
tion of interests and abilities requirement of subsection (c), ' and bring
45 C.F.R. section 86.41(b) within constitutional bounds.
Elizabeth J. Henley
ticipation, then the presumption could be upheld. Even if this irrebuttable presumption is not upheld, those boys who try out for the girls' teams may still be excluded if
they are overqualified. This is so because the irrebuttable presumption doctrine only
requires that an individual be given a chance to rebut the presumption. See notes 57-58
and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 70 supra.
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